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decreasingly important that the wife is basing her suit on
an alimony or support award, or that third parties are
suing to recover for necessities advanced to the wife or
child. It is to be hoped that the Maryland Court will not
be overpowered by the inertia of past decisions dealing
with spendthrift trusts to the extent of accepting as law
their failure to state an exception not necessary to their re-
sult. It would be better policy to fall in line with the
sound view of public welfare to the effect that a wife or
child in a suit whose real nature is one for support may
reach the income from a spendthrift trust.
ENFORCEABILITY OF FOREIGN DECREES FOR
ALIMONY OR SUPPORT
Bauernschmidt v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.'
As pointed out in the previous note, this case presents
the question whether Maryland will, treat as alimony an
award of money by a California decree, confirming a sepa-
ration agreement, which was effective as an award of ali-
mony in California, when the Maryland Courts have failed
to consider such a decree rendered in Maryland as the
equivalent of an award of alimony. The Maryland Court
of Appeals refused to give this effect to the California de-
cree, saying, in essence, that since Maryland refuses to give
this effect to its own decrees, the full faith and credit clause
of the United States Constitution does not require that a
foreign decree be given more effect than a similar decree
of the forum. In support of this contention the Court of
Appeals relied on two earlier decisions which had refused
to consider a judicially ratified separation agreement as
the equivalent of an award of alimony.2 While the deci-
sion, therefore, as indicated in the preceding note, resolved
itself into a determination of the attachability of the in-
come from a spendthrift trust under this particular type
of foreign decree, there is suggested the problem of the
general enforceability of foreign decrees for alimony or for
support.
The relief at law seems to be fairly well determined by
the United States Supreme Court holdings; and their bind-
1176 Md. 351, 4 A. (2d) 712 (1939). The same case is noted in the
preceding casenote on another point.
2 Dickey v. Dickey, 154 Md. 675, 141 A. 387, 58 A. L. R. 634 (1928) Bush-
man v. Bushman, 157 Md. 166, 145 A. 488 (1929).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ing authority has been followed in one earlier Maryland
case, as well as recognized in the opinion in the instant
case. A decree in one state for the payment of a sum of
money for alimony past due has been held entitled to en-
forcement in another state under the full faith and credit
clause of the Federal constitution.3 Later, the same pro-
tection was afforded to installments falling due after the
foreign decree was rendered if such past due installments
were not subject to modification under the law of the state
where such decree was rendered. Maryland has one deci-
sion summarizing this constitutional law and recognizing
its obligation to follow it.' This general law under the full
faith and credit clause would seem to apply to final decrees
for support, or decrees ratifying consent settlements of the
parties, as well as to decrees in the nature of "true ali-
mony". The distinction between such decrees made later
in the discussion of equitable enforcement would seem to
be precluded as to legal enforcement, as recognized in the
opinion in the instant case.0 There remains only the ques-
tion whether the Courts of Maryland (or of any state) will
go further than the full faith and credit clause compels,
and give voluntary recognition to past due installments,
even though capable of modification, if in fact they are not
modifiedJ although it has generally been held that this will
not be done.
Granted general enforceability at law of a foreign final
order for alimony or support, the unpaid wife, who cannot
discover her former husband's assets in the forum where
she catches him, might be desirous of securing recognition
Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 183, 21 S. Ct. 555, 45 L. Ed. 810 (1901).
Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1, 30 S. Ct. 682, 54 L. Ed. 905, 28 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1068, 20 Ann. Cas. 1061 (1910).
5 Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 152 Md. 49, 135 A. 840 (1927), allowing
suit in Maryland for past due Installments of alimony under a Virginia
decree, and presuming (as had been done In the Si8tare case, supra) that
such installments were not subject to modification in absence of proof
to the contrary.
6 The Court recognized that legal enforcement might be had of the very
California decree therein Involved.
7 This would seem to be the same as the problem of the possible lag be-
tween compulsory and voluntary recognition of foreign single-domicil di-
vorces. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 28 S. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867, 5
Ann. Cas. 1 (1906). On the point raised in the text Cf. II BEALE, CON-
FLICT op LAWS (1935) Sec. 435.2, n. 4, although the cases cited to support
the text of Beale generally fall to go as far as suggested in our text above.
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws, See. 464, states its principles In the
limited terms of the Sistare case, supra n. 4; and It Is generally accepted
as law that if the decree is subject to modification as to past due instal-
ments, recognition will be denied, GooDicH, CONFUICT OF LAWs (2d ed.,
1938) See. 135, n. 107.
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in equity of her foreign order and the application of the
general sanctions for contempt. At the outset, because of
purely local Maryland cases, the problem divides itself
into: (1) decrees for support not in the nature of alimony
and (2), "true" alimony decrees. As to the first, Mary-
land has already denied the applicability of the contempt
sentence to any but "true" alimony decrees of its own
courts.' As indicated by the instant case, it seems unlikely
that a greater credit would be accorded to a foreign decree
which is not "true" alimony as the Maryland cases have
defined it.
The distinction in Maryland between "true" alimony
and other decrees for support money results from a line of
several cases. The first is Emerson v. Emerson,9 where the
Court was faced with this problem in connection with the
power of equity to modify its decree as to future instal-
ments because of supervening circumstances. In the
Emerson case the Court distinguished between the types of
alimony decrees which equity could hand down over the
objection of the defendant and those which it could not im-
pose without consent of the defendant husband. Orders
for periodical payments to extend beyond the death of the
first deceasing spouse, orders for lump sum settlements, or
for contributions to the wife in other forms than by regular
money payments were said not to be "true" alimony and ac-
cordingly not capable of incorporation in decrees without
consent; and if there were consent to insert them, such pro-
visions might not be modified because of supervening cir-
cumstances, as might be done with "true" alimony. The
next case, Dickey v. Dickey10 was in reality only an af-
firmation of the Emerson holding.
In the later case of Bushman v. Bushman,1' the distinc-
tion between "true" alimony and other types of judicial
support orders was involved in two different connections,
both with respect to the power of equity to imprison for
contempt. One of these was the problem which arose in
the Emerson case, there with respect to the power to
modify, of whether consent decrees in favor of a wife con-
stitute alimony. It was held that a consent decree for a
lump sum settlement was not true alimony and, therefore,
the husband could not be imprisoned for contempt for dis-
See Bushman v. Bushman, supra., n. 2, discussed infra, circa n. 11.
0120 Md. 584, 87 A. 1033 (1913).
'0 154 Md. 675, 141 A. 387, 58 A. L. R. 634 (1928).
11 Supra, n. 2.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
obedience to it. On the other point, the power to imprison
for contempt was held inapplicable, also, to a portion of a
decree providing separately for support of the child. This
latter conclusion resulted from the fact that the Court
viewed support orders for children as "debts", and there-
fore within the constitutional prohibition against imprison-
ment for debt. Subsequent cases have held that a single
order combining alimony for the wife and support for the
children may be enforced by contempt procedure.12
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that
the full faith and credit clause does not accord a foreign
judgment every incident given by the state of rendition, 3
and, as emphasized in the instant decision, has said the
mode of enforcement is for the forum to determine." Un-
less the Supreme Court should direct to the contrary, it
would seem likely that Maryland would deny other equi-
table remedies to the enforcement of foreign decrees not
in the nature of "true" alimony as delineated in the above
Maryland cases, just as in the instant case, the Court re-
fused to consider the special right in equity to reach a
spendthrift trust for alimony on the basis that the foreign
decree was not "true" alimony. 5 Whether the Supreme
Court will extend full faith and credit to cover this situa-
tion is, at present, but pure conjecture. Such action seems
unlikely because of the general assumption of the cases
that the domain of enforcement is outside the control of
the full faith and credit clause.
As to "true alimony decrees, there is no existing Mary-
land authority. Authority elsewhere is divided into three
views, two of which are opposed to giving the wife relief,
while the third supports her contention. There are some
courts which take the view that, since the'plaintiff may
resort to law and have her redress there, she can not make
out a case for equitable relief.'" Other courts oppose giv-
"Cohen v. Cohen, 174 Md. 61, 197 A. 564 (1938), noted (1938) 3 Md. L.
Rev. 93; Knabe v. Knabe, 176 Md. 606, 6 A. (2d) 366 (1939), noted (1939)
3 Md. L. Rev. 367.
"McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 10 L. Ed. 177 (1839); Bellman v.
Pope, 138 Md. 482, 114 A. 568 (1921) ; Brengle v. McCellan, 7 G. & J. 434
(1836). See Hospelhorn v. General Motors, 169 Md. 564, 182 A. 442 (1935)
for a statement supporting the holdings of the last two cases.
14 Ibid.
15 See the preceding casenote in this Issue of the Rzrmw.
10 Grant v. Grant, 64 App. D. C. 146, 75 F. (2d) 665 (1935); Page v.
Page, 189 Mass. 85, 75 N. E. 92, 4 Ann. Cas. 296 (1905) ; Weidman v.
Weidman, 274 Mass. 118, 174 N. E. 206, 76 A. L. R. 1359 (1931) ; Bennett
v. Bennett, 63 N. J. Eq. 306, 49 A. 501 (1901).
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ing equitable relief on the basis that, while the full faith
and credit clause protects the substance of the plaintiff's
rights and compels recognition of foreign judgments, it has
no reference at all to the method of, or remedy for, enforce-
ment of a foreign judgment." Those courts, which will give
relief in equity to the plaintiff, do so, not under any com-
pulsions of the full faith and credit clause, but rather vol-
untarily because of the public policy involved in compell-
ing a husband and father to meet his alimentary duties.'"
The view which supports equitable enforcement is appar-
ently in accord with the trend of the later cases."9 As it is
put by one annotator, the "better considered recent cases
adhere to the view . . . that the courts of a state will en-
force a foreign decree for alimony, or, more accurately
speaking, a local judgment based on a foreign decree for
alimony, by equitable remedies, as by contempt for failure
to comply with the orders of the Court, as is customary in
the enforcement of local decrees for alimony."2
Where there are local statutes involved giving equi-
table remedies for enforcement of alimony decrees, a (sim-
ilar) division of authority exists in construing their ef-
fect. Those courts, which in the absence of statute, re-
fuse to give equitable relief, refuse also to give relief
where there is a statute.2' The basis of their action is
the view that local statutes applying equitable remedies
apply only to decrees of local courts. In other words,
they hold that the legislature was not intending to enact
a conflict of laws rule when it passed the statute, but rather
it was concerned with local policy.22 Those courts, which
give voice to equitable enforcement in the absence of a
statute, generally do so when a statute exists. Their posi-
tion is that these statutes do not, unless they specifically
so state, contract the courts' observance of the public wel-
17 Bullock v. Bullock, 52 N. J. Eq. 561, 30 A. 676, 27 L. R. A. 213, 46 Am.
St. Rep. 528 (1894) ; see also Lynde v. Lynde, supra, n. 3; Contra, Fanchlier
v. Gammill, 148 Miss. 723, 114 So. 813 (1927).
18 Ostrander v. Ostrander, 190 Minn. 547, 252 N. W. 449 (1934) ; Creager
v. Superior Ct., 126 Cal. App. 280, 14 P. (2d) 552 (1932) ; Fanchier v. Gain-
mill, supra, n. 17; Shibley v. Shibley, 181 Wash. 166, 42 P. (2d) 446, 97 A.
L. R. 1191 (1935).
19 See 109 A. L. R. 653; and Note, Alimony Alter Foreign Decrees of
Divorce (1940) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1180.
20 Ibid.; Bruton v. Tearle, 7 Cal. (2d) 48, 59 P. (2d) 953, 106 A. L. R.
580 (1936) ; German v. German, 122 Conn. 155, 188 A. 429 (1936) ; Cousi-
neau v. Cousineau, 155 Ore. 184, 63 P. (2d) 897, 109 A. L. R. 643 (1936).
21 Notes 16, 17, supra; also Wood v. Wood, 7 Misc. 579, 28 N. Y. S. 154
(1894) ; Mayer v. Mayer, 154 Mich. 386, 117 N. W. 890, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.)
245, 129 Am. St. Rep. 477 (1908).
82 Ibid.
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fare of the state in the development of conflict of laws
rules; but rather that they are only declaratory of the law
as to local practice. 3 Also, some of these courts adopt as
their basis of support the view that these statutes, unless
they are expressly to the contrary, enumerate a conflict
of laws rule as well as state a local policy.24
In the absence of authority in Maryland, one can only
speculate as to the reaction of the courts to the above
possible courses of action. In handling the related prob-
lem of the attempt of a wife to secure alimony for the
first time in a new and independent proceeding in Mary-
land after an absolute divorce obtained elsewhere with-
out alimony having been asked for or given in the for-
eign proceeding,25 the Court of Appeals, in Staub v.
Staub," chose the technical and conservative course of
refusing relief on the theory that the basis for alimony
(the relation of husband and wife) was not present (hav-
ing been destroyed by the foreign decree). At the time,
there was out-of-state authority to support this course,27
but, there was equally as good authority to support the
granting of relief on the theory that the wife, never having
had her day in Court on the alimony claim, should get
it in the forum where she could reach her former hus-
band.28 The Staub case, accordingly, might be taken as
indicative of a conservative approach to the instant prob-
lem, or even as authority that Maryland could not have
a new equity proceeding for alimony after a foreign de-
cree for divorce accompanied by a grant of alimony. Such
latter argument, however, would seem unsound because
the wife would not be asking (as in the Staub case) for
equitable relief dependent solely on the obligation of the
husband, as husband; but, she would be asking for equita-
ble relief on an obligation established by the foreign de-
cree. Whatever view is accepted here, the reasoning of
the Staub case could not apply to a foreign decree for ali-
mony without divorce, or for alimony accompanying a
21 Supra, n. 18.
24 Ibid.
25 If alimony had been asked for in the foreign court and been refused it
would be res Judicata in the forum. See GOODRICH, CONFIcT OF LAWS,
(2nd Rd., 1938) Sec. 135, N. 111.
26 Staub v. Staub, 170 Md. 202, 183 A. 605 (1931), noted (1937) 50 Harv.
L. Rev. 526.
27 McCoy v. McCoy, 191 Iowa 973, 183 N. W. 377 (1921) ; GOODowcH, op.
cit. supra, n. 25, Secs. 366-369.28 Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 131 S. W. 977, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1106, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 284 (1910) ; GOODRICH, tc. cit. aupra, n. 27.
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partial divorce, for in such cases, the marital relation would
not be dissolved by the foreign decree.
It might be argued that the Maryland constitutional
provision against imprisonment for debt precludes local
enforcement by new decree in equity plus contempt sanc-
tions (either by voluntary judicial action, or under some
new statute) because the foreign decree already has been
held to be no more than a "debt of record" for the pur-
pose of obtaining a law judgment in enforcement there-
of. 29 This problem is simply one of terminology and is
easily resolved if sound policy should call for local en-
forcement in equity. A purely local decree for alimony
is treated as a law judgment (debt of record) so a§ to
be the basis for execution, as well as subjecting the de-
fendant to imprisonment for contempt because of fail-
ure to pay. Also, by the same Court of Appeals which
called it no debt for purposes of applying contempt sanc-
tions, the alimony decree has been called a debt for pur-
poses of application of the law of conveyances in fraud
of creditors.8 0 It might be mentioned, also, that even
though the Court of Appeals should deem the Maryland
constitutional provision applicable, it would have to give
way to the federal constitutional provision should full
faith and credit be extended to equitable as well as legal
enforcement of foreign decrees.3 1
Another argument against a new equitable decree in
Maryland to enforce the foreign decree might be that the
new decree would be in essence only a decree for alimony,
and that there would be no procedure for obtaining such
decree. This would rest on the argument that equity's
powers to grant alimony are purely statutory and do not
include such a procedure for relief based on a foreign de-
cree. The answer to this argument is two fold. First,
the statutory given powers of equity to grant alimony
are merely declaratory of certain powers of the equity
courts, and not necessarily exclusive of others, the equity
courts in Maryland having exercised the general power
to grant alimony prior to the statute.3 2 Secondly, this par-
29 See the Rosenberg case, supra, n. 5 and the Sistare case, supra, n. 4.
Levin v. Levin, 161 Md. 451, 171 A. 77 (1933).
Si No Supreme Court authority goes that far as yet. Of. Cook, The
Powers of Courts of Equity (1915) 15 Col. L. Rev., 37, 106, 228; Cook, The
Powers of Congress Under The Full Faith and Credit Clause (1919) 28
Yale L. J. 421; Lorenzen, Application of Full Faith and Credit Clause to
Equitable Decrees for the Conveyance of Foreign Land (1925) 34 Yale
L. J. 591; Lorenzen, Enforcement of American Judgments Abroad (1919)
29 Yale L. J. 188.
1MAUSHAJ- & MAY, TrE DIvosEn COUnT-MARYLAND (1932) 97,
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ticular right of equity to give such relief has already been
recognized as existent in a number of equity courts else-
where without statutory authority.3
At best, the whole problem, like most others, resolves
itself into one on which the courts can find an argument
to support their position whichever view they may choose
to take. Therefore, it is submitted that their choice should
be governed by a determination of the wisdom (as a mat-
ter of sound social policy) of extending or denying the
equitable sanctions in favor of a wife trying to collect
alimony from a husband seeking sanctuary in a forum
other than that which rendered her original decree for
alimony. The trend of authority, as indicated earlier, 4
is toward extending the sanctions of equity to the enforce-
ment of awards of alimony of sister states. This may
occur either by judicial decision under the inherent powers
of equity or by statutory enunciation of such policy. It
is not inconceivable that the full faith and credit clause
protection will be so extended either by Supreme Court
interpretation or by Congressional direction. 5
Whatever the basis which the courts may use in up-
holding equitable enforcement, it is obviously more prefer-
able than the view which is opposed to allowing resort
to equity. There are really two important factors in-
volved. There is the public policy implicit in the duty of
a husband to support his wife. There is also the ques-
tion of saving the state from the possible burden of hav-
ing to undertake the support of indigent wives; wives who
would otherwise not be indigent if the husband were com-
pelled to meet his duties. The long arm of equity is a
greater insurance to the wife and the public and a more
caustic reminder to the errant husband than are the law
courts. Modern conceptions of interstate comity would
seem to call for full recognition in equity of a foreign de-
cree for alimony. And, the public policy involved should
be sufficient reason to support the modern tendencies of
the cases to give real understanding to the pristine mean-
ing of the words "full faith and credit."3
"Cousineau v. Cousineau, 155 Ore. 184, 63 P. (2d) 897, 109 A. L. R. 643(1936), noted (1937) 16 Ore. L. Rev. 288; Cummings v. Cummings, 97 Cal.
App. 144, 275 P. 245 (1929) ; German v. German, 122 Conn. 155, 188 A. 429
(1936). See supra, n. 18.
3, Supra circa n. 19.
08 See articles cited, supra n. 31, and Wigmore, E.recution of Foreign
Judgments (1926) 21 Ill. L. Rev. 1; Yntema, The Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Anglo-American Law (1935) 33 Mich. L. Rev. 1128.
,
0 Ibid.
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